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ABSTRACT 
 
Buildings that provide sporting, entertainment, and leisure facilities (e.g. sports arenas, 
exhibition halls, etc) can often contain large enclosed spaces or voids. In the event of a 
fire, these buildings often require the use of a smoke management system to provide 
conditions for safe means of escape for the building occupants.  
This paper raises a range of issues relating to smoke management in buildings with large 
enclosed spaces, including smoke management methods, design scenarios and some 
simple calculation methods.  
Experience of actual installed systems in real buildings has led to concerns on the 
efficacy of some smoke management systems, especially over the lifetime of a building. 
This paper discusses some of these concerns, real examples of sources of failure, and the 
importance of proper documentation, commissioning, maintenance and testing of these 
systems. As a way of addressing these concerns, a process validation methodology is 
presented to evaluate the design, the designer, the implementation of the design, and the 
long-term management, operation and maintenance of such systems.   
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The majority of deaths in fire are due to the inhalation of smoke. Smoke causes direct 
visual obscuration by absorbing and scattering light, reduces the visibility of escape signs 
and may cause pain to the eyes and respiratory tract. Smoke may also reduce or eliminate 
the capacity for building occupants to escape due to reduced visibility and thermal 
hazards. Another consideration is the toxic hazard of asphyxiant gases (such as carbon 
monoxide, carbon dioxide and hydrogen cyanide). 
The controlling physical processes in the movement of smoke in a fire are: 
• Buoyancy forces - due to the density difference between hot gases and ambient air. 
• Air expansion forces - generated by heat from the fire. 
• Internal building airflow - e.g. due to stack effect, lift motion. 
• Forced ventilation - e.g. smoke exhaust, HVAC, wind effects. 
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Buildings that provide sporting, entertainment, and leisure facilities can often contain 
large enclosed spaces or voids. These large enclosed spaces can occupy many storeys in 
height. In the event of a fire, the lack of physical separations (e.g. walls, floors) can allow 
smoke and hot gases to move unimpeded to locations far removed from the fire source. 
These types of buildings are also likely to contain significant numbers of people and can 
contain large quantities of combustible materials. Therefore, controlling the production 
and transport of smoke is of particular importance.  
The use of a smoke management system in buildings with large enclosed spaces can 
provide conditions to allow safe means of escape, by ensuring adequate separation 
between the escaping occupants and the hot smoky gases from a fire. Property protection 
can primarily be achieved by providing improved conditions for effective fire-fighting 
operations in addition to limiting the spread and temperature of the smoke.   
The design of these systems requires appropriate calculation methods to predict the 
volume of smoky gases produced in order to determine the required exhaust fan capacity 
or ventilator area for a required design layer height. There are considerable differences in 
the calculated smoke production rates depending upon the chosen design fire scenario 
and calculation method. Whilst over-sizing of the required smoke exhaust can be 
uneconomical, under-sizing can compromise life safety and property protection. 
 
2 SMOKE MANAGEMENT METHODS 
There are a number of different smoke management methods available for buildings 
which contain large enclosed spaces.  Morgan et al [1] describe various alternative 
approaches such as:  
• Smoke and heat exhaust ventilation - Smoke management in buildings with large 
enclosed spaces is generally provided by a Smoke and Heat Exhaust Ventilation 
System (SHEVS). Hot smoky gases are collected at high level and vented to the 
outside (see Figure 1). Supply of inlet replacement air below the smoke layer is 
crucial, and must be included in the design along with the sizing of the smoke venting 
system. Natural or mechanical exhaust ventilators can be used, with the latter 
required, for example, if external wind effects are likely to reduce the efficacy of 
smoke exhaust.  Some form of physical smoke containment may also be required, for 
example, using smoke curtains or downstands to create smoke reservoirs. A critical 
design parameter for this type of system is the clear layer height between the 
occupants and the smoke layer interface. Guidance on acceptable clear layer heights 
varies worldwide [2-5], but is usually of the order of 2 to 3 m above the highest 
egress route open to the enclosed space. 
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Figure 1:  Smoke and Heat Exhaust Ventilation (courtesy of NV IFSET SA) 
 
• Smoke and heat exhaust from each storey separately - In some cases it may be 
impractical to provide smoke exhaust ventilation from the space if the height of rise 
of the smoke layer from the floor is too large. It may be beneficial to prevent smoke 
from entering the space altogether. This can be achieved by the use of strategically 
placed smoke curtains around the enclosed space at each storey, and providing smoke 
exhaust ventilation from each storey separately. 
• Depressurisation - Where the boundary between a large enclosed space and adjacent 
areas are linked by small openings (e.g. doors gaps, leaky façade), it is possible to 
prevent smoke from travelling through these openings to adjacent areas by reducing 
the pressure of the gases in the smoke layer. In this case, smoky gases are removed 
from the smoke-affected space in a way that maintains the desired pressure 
differences and/or air speeds across leakage openings between that space and adjacent 
spaces. This approach is known as depressurisation. This technique is similar to that 
employed for natural environmental ventilation in atrium buildings [6]. 
• Temperature control ventilation from the large enclosed space - This strategy is used 
when the height of the smoke layer above the floor is not a critical design parameter.  
In this case, smoke exhaust can be used to achieve a maximum value of the 
temperature of the layer of smoky gases.  This approach allows the use of materials 
which would otherwise be damaged by hot gases (e.g. façade materials which are not 
fire-resisting). 
• Smoke filling - This approach can be applied to buildings which have particularly 
large volumes, such that smoke ventilation may not be necessary.  This strategy 
becomes viable when smoke can be contained in a roof void for the duration of the 
required safe egress time for the occupants of the building. In this case, the height of 
the smoke layer may not reach an unacceptable value before the fire consumes the 
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available fuel.  This approach assumes that the fire grows at a predictable rate.  Klote 
and Milke [7] provide empirical relationships to determine the smoke layer height 
above the fire with respect to time for both steady and growing fires. This strategy 
should only be used if the designer can demonstrate by calculation that smoke 
ventilation is not necessary. 
• Smoke clearance - This approach provides sufficient ventilation to remove smoke 
from the enclosed space after the fire has been suppressed. 
 
3 DESIGN FIRE SCENARIOS 
The volume of smoky gases generated from a fire within a large enclosed space is highly 
governed by the amount of air entrained into the rising smoke plume. The amount of air 
entrained into the plume will depend on the configuration of the plume produced. Milke 
[8] identified five configurations of smoke plume which may exist within buildings with 
large enclosed spaces, these are: 
• Axisymmetric plume - An axisymmetric plume is generally expected from a fire 
located near the centre of a space or room.  Entrainment of air will occur over the full 
height of the plume until it reaches the interface with a smoke layer which may have 
formed above (see Figure 1).  
• Spill plume - If a fire were to occur in a room (e.g. a shop unit, concession area) 
fronting onto a large enclosed space, a horizontally moving buoyant layer of hot 
smoky gases will form within that room (see Figure 2). This layer will spread 
laterally and flow toward the opening connecting to the space. If there are no smoke 
control measures to confine the smoke layer to the room of origin, this horizontally 
moving layer will flow out of the opening. If a balcony exists beyond the 
compartment opening, smoke will flow beneath the balcony. The smoke flow will 
then rotate around the free edge of the balcony. The smoke will then rise vertically as 
a plume into the space and entrain large quantities of air. This type of plume is 
commonly known as a balcony spill plume.   
Spill plumes can be categorised into two groups: balcony and adhered spill plumes, 
depending on whether a balcony is present from the room opening adjacent to the 
enclosed space.  Figure 3 shows a schematic drawing of an adhered spill plume.  In 
this case, there is no balcony present at the room opening and the subsequent plume 
adheres to the vertical surface above the opening as it rises.  
 
  5
 
Figure 2:  A balcony spill plume (courtesy of NV IFSET SA) 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  An adhered spill plume (courtesy of NV IFSET SA) 
 
• Wall plume - A plume which is generated from a fire against a wall is known as a 
wall plume. Zukoski [9] developed a wall plume entrainment correlation based on 
“mirror symmetry”.  Work by Poreh and Garrad [10] as highlighted that further 
research on wall plume entrainment is desirable.  
• Corner plume - A plume which is generated from a fire located in the corner of a 
room, where the walls form a 90o angle, is known as a corner plume.  Zukoski [9] 
treated corner plumes in a similar manner to a wall plume with the use of “mirror 
symmetry” for plume entrainment.  Again, work by Poreh and Garrad [10] has 
demonstrated that further research is desirable for corner plume entrainment.   
• Window plume - A window plume is a plume which flows from a window (or 
doorway) into an enclosed space [7]. Window plumes are generated from post-
flashover fires [11] and therefore only have limited applicability. The window plume 
entrainment correlation is given by Klote and Milke [7].   
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4 SIMPLE CALCULATION METHODS 
The designer has a number of options available for evaluating the performance of a 
smoke management system. When applying systems to ‘standard’ type geometries, 
various guidance publications [e.g. 1,2,12,13] provide simple ‘hand calculation’ methods 
which can be used.  This section will focus on some of these simple ‘hand calculation’ 
methods available for the axisymmetric and spill plume design fire scenarios.  
For complicated and novel designs, or when the smoke management system deviates 
from ‘standard’ configurations, it may be necessary for the designer to model the 
movement of smoke using either reduced scale physical modelling or computer 
modelling. However, these methods are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be 
further discussed. 
4.1 Axisymmetric plume 
Morgan and Mason [14] carried out a comparison of four commonly used design 
formulae to predict the mass flow rate of gases produced from an axisymmetric plume. 
These formulae are given by,  
1. Zukoski et al [15]  
2. The Chartered Institute of Building Service Engineers (CIBSE), UK  [13] 
3. Heskestad [16] 
4. Thomas et al [17] 
Zukoski et al [15] developed the following correlation from experimental data 
( ) 3/503/1071.0 zzQM c −=    (1) 
where 
M = the mass flow rate of air entrained into the plume (kg/s) 
cQ = the convective heat flow in the plume (kW) 
z = height of smoke layer above the base of the fire (kW) 
0z = height above the base of the fire of the virtual origin of the smoke plume (m) 
Equation 1 applies to plumes with a value of z  higher than the height of the luminous 
flame in the fire plume. Equation 1 treats the plume as if it rose from a virtual point 
source at a height of 0z . Where 
5/2
0 083.002.1 cQDz +−=    (2) 
where, 
D = effective horizontal dimension of the fire (m)  
CIBSE [13] also adopts Equation 1 for design purposes, however, the CIBSE [13] 
approach states that ‘For most solid fuels found in buildings, the value of 0z  is likely to 
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be small and for design purposes it may be taken as zero, that is, the source is at the base 
of the fire.’ 
By assuming that 0z = 0, Morgan and Mason [14] treated the CIBSE [13] approach as a 
separate formula for comparison purposes. 
Heskestad [16] developed an alternative design formula by re-analysing the data given by 
Zukoski et al [15], given by Equation 3. 
( ) ( )[ ]67.1067.067.1033.0 026.01071.0 −−+−= zzQzzQM cc   (3) 
In this case, both z and 0z  are measured from the top of the fuel stack, rather than at the 
base. 
The final design formula used for comparison purposes was developed by Thomas et al 
[17]. This is more commonly known as the ‘large fire plume model’ and was simplified 
by Hinkley [18] to become 
5.1188.0 PzM =  (4) 
where 
P = the horizontal perimeter of the fire (m) 
It was originally thought that Equation 4 was only applicable for low heights of rise of 
plume, however, Hinkley [18] and Poreh and Morgan [19] have shown that Equation 4 
applies a much greater range of heights of rise of plume (e.g. up to 10 times the value of 
D ). 
Morgan and Mason [14] carried out a range comparisons by varying z  and the 
convective heat output per unit area of the fire source. Comparisons gave rise to the 
following conclusions: 
• The Heskestad method consistently predicted a higher mass flow rate compared to the 
Zukoski et al method. Since the Heskestad method defines z from the top of the stack 
of fuel, whereas, the comparisons assumed a liquid fuel fire at floor level, Morgan 
and Mason raised the possibility that this method was being used outside its range of 
application. However, the Heskestad model gave reasonably close agreement with the 
large fire plume model, particularly at higher heights of rise. 
• The Zukoski et el method usually predicts a lower entrainment compared to the large 
fire plume model, however, the difference was within 20% for the range conditions 
studied. 
• The effect of assuming that 0z = 0 (i.e. using the CIBSE method) was relatively small 
for fires with large convective heat release rates per unit area (i.e. approx 750 
kW/m2), but becomes very significant for fires with smaller heat release rates (i.e. 
approx 250 kW/m2). These discrepancies were worse for shorter heights of rise, with 
differences up to a factor of 2 for the range of conditions studied (i.e. for heights of 
rise up to 4 m). 
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• The effect of assuming that 0z = 0 can lead to serious underestimates of mass 
entrainment when using the CIBSE method compared to the Zukoski et al method 
where 0z  is calculated explicitly. 
• The advice given by CIBSE, to take 0z = 0 for all practical engineering designs, 
should be disregarded for low heat release rates per unit area and for relatively short 
heights of rise. 
• As a higher predicted mass flow rate will lead to a more conservative approach in 
smoke management calculations, the continued use of the large fire plume model can 
be justified for many designs. 
4.2 Spill plume 
There are various simple calculation methods for the balcony spill plume which are 
currently used by designers of smoke management systems. Some of the most commonly 
used methods are given by: 
• Law [20] 
• CIBSE [13] 
• NFPA 92B [12] 
 
Law [20] developed the following formula to determine the mass flow rate of gases 
produced by a balcony spill plume given by,  
( )compT hzWQM 25.0)(31.0 3/12 +=   (5) 
 
where 
 
TQ    = the total heat release rate (kW). 
comph = the height of the balcony above the base of the room opening (m). 
W = width of compartment opening (m) 
z = height of rise of plume above the spill edge (m) 
A modified version of Equation 5 is included within guidance given by CIBSE [13] and 
in NFPA 92B [12] given by Equation 6. 
( )compc hzWQM 25.0)(36.0 3/12 +=   (6)                          
Comparison of these methods with new experimental scale model data (i.e. from a 1/10th 
physical scale model) obtained by Harrison [21], for a range of fire sizes, is shown in 
Figure 4 by plotting ( ) 3/1'
'
TQ
M
 with respect to z  for the method by Law, and ( ) 3/1'
'
cQ
M
 with 
respect to z  for the CIBSE and NFPA 92B method. 
where, 
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Figure 4:  Comparison of calculation methods for the balcony spill plume with data from Harrison 
[21] 
 
Figure 4 shows that all the simplified formulae under-predict the mass flow rate due to a 
balcony spill plume at a very low height of rise. However, above a height of rise of 
approximately 0.3 m (3 m full scale), all of the methods generally tend to over predict the 
mass flow rate of gases due to a balcony spill plume. The slope of the line relating the 
mass flow rate gases with respect to the height of rise of the plume, is generally greater 
for the various simplified formulae compared to the experiment.   
The experimental data obtained by Harrison [21] has been used to develop a new simple 
calculation method in the form of Equation 8. 
bcc MQzWQM 5.10017.020.0
3/23/1 ++=        (8) 
where, 
bM = the mass flow rate of gases at the spill edge (kg/s) 
At present, there are no robust simple calculation methods for the adhered spill plume. 
Further research continues on the development of new and improved calculation methods 
for the spill plume at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. 
For the specific case of a plume flowing into single storey mall, whose ceiling is not too 
much taller than the shop unit opening onto the mall, the following simplified formula, 
which is an extension of Equation 4,  is given by Morgan et al [1].  
 5.138.0 PzM =   (9) 
However, it must be stressed that Equation 9 is particularly case specific, and only 
applies where the height of rise of plume is less than 2 m above the top of the shop 
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opening. Equation 9 can now be considered to be superseded by new guidance [21] on 
the influence of balcony/downstand combinations on smoke flows from compartments. 
4.2.1 The importance of the spill plume 
Milke [22] carried out a comparison between the smoke production rate of an 
axisymmetric plume with that of a balcony spill plume.  The smoke production rate for 
the spill plume was determined using the formula developed by Law [20].  Comparison 
between each type of plume was made for a fire with a convective flow in the plume of       
5000 kW. The smoke production rate for the spill plume was determined for a variety of 
balcony heights and spill edge lengths. 
 
 
 
Figure 5:   Comparison of smoke production between an axisymmetric and a balcony spill plume [22] 
 
Milke [22] demonstrated that for the conditions studied, the spill plume entrains a greater 
amount of air than an axisymmetric plume for a height of rise up to 40 m (see Figure 5).  
This height of rise will cater for the majority of design layer heights in buildings with 
large enclosed spaces and confirms that the spill plume generally provides the worst case 
condition for smoke production rate. Beyond a height of 40 m, the spill and axisymmetric 
plumes are likely to behave similarly in terms of smoke production rate.  This is likely to 
be due to entrainment into the ends of the spill plume as it rises, causing it to become 
three dimensional in nature, and similar to an axisymmetric plume. 
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5 SYSTEM RELIABILITY, COMMISSIONING, MAINTENANCE AND 
MANAGEMENT 
Smoke management systems can be complex and involve the operation of many 
interacting components, including detection systems, exhaust fans, natural ventilators, 
automatic smoke curtains, dampers, fresh air intakes, etc. Experience of actual installed 
systems in real buildings has led to concerns on the efficacy of some smoke management 
systems, especially over the lifetime of a building.  
5.1 Reliability 
There is limited data on the reliability of smoke management systems. Klote and Milke 
[7] provide data based on five different system designs as shown in Table 1 . The level of 
complexity was increased for each design. 
System No of HVAC No of other Reliability of new Mean life of
system fans components system before commissioned 
commissioning system (months)
#1 3 0 0.97 116
#2 0 3 0.83 46
#3 3 9 0.56 14
#4 5 18 0.31 8
#5 5 54 0.03 3  
Table 1:  Reliability data given by Klote and Milke [7] 
 
Table 1 shows that as the number of components used in the system increases, the 
reliability of the system decreases significantly, such that the mean life of the 
commissioned system with 5 fans and 54 other components is just 3 months. However, it 
must be stressed that the analysis assumed that failure of any one component would lead 
to failure of the complete system, which may not be the case in reality.  
Moran [23] carried out a survey of smoke exhaust systems in shopping centres around the 
Brisbane region. 32 centres responded to the survey of which 15 had some form of smoke 
exhaust system. 5 out of the 15 centres reported problems, with various incidents of 
failure, such as: motor (1), contractor (1), fan bearing (3), fan motor blade (3), fire 
detection (2) and water ingress (1). 
Moore and Timms [24] provided data on the efficacy of systems from less complex 
designs that are appropriate for low-rise shopping centres (see Table 2).   
 
        Probability of attaining the efficacy range: Design 1, Design 2
Efficacy range                     Maintenance, Installation and Commissioning quality
Low Medium High
<25% 0.128,0.143 0.008, 0.0089 0.0015, 0.0016
>25% and <50% 0.083,0.216 0.023, 0.042 0.0188, 0.0244
>50% and <75% 3.1 x 10-10, 5.1 x 10-13 3.8 x 10-14, 7.5 x 10-17 8.2 x 10-16, 2.8 x 10-18
>75% 0.789, 0.64 0.968, 0.949 0.979, 0.974  
 
Table 2: Reliability data from Moore and Timms [24] 
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These data demonstrate the benefits of a robust maintenance, installation and 
commissioning regime in increasing the probability of the efficacy of a smoke 
management system over the lifetime of a building. 
5.2 Sources of failure  
The efficacy of a smoke management system can be dependent on a number of factors. 
Morgan [25] describes some common sources of error in the design, construction and 
implementation of a smoke management system.  The following list of errors is not 
definitive [25]: 
• Inadequate theories - All calculation methods have theories which have been 
developed for relatively idealised geometries. Real buildings can depart from those 
ideal conditions. Typical examples include: spill plumes rising past non-straight spill 
edges; where the smoke flow approaches the straight spill edge at other than a right 
angle; and plumes which are partially adhered and partially free. 
• Unknown input data - The building geometry is usually known when designing, but 
there are several necessary input parameters which are more subjective in many cases 
(i.e. specifying the design fire).  
• Poor communications - There can be poor communications between the system 
designer and the installer/s of the system; and between both and the architect; and 
between all of them and the regulators. Examples include: 
o a system which had smoke curtains installed 1.5 metres too short. 
o channelling screens fitted half-way across a shop’s open front, completely 
negating the reason for fitting them. 
o a hole in fixed smoke curtains at the reservoir boundary in order to allow a 
smoke detector’s light beam to pass through.  
Problems can arise when late detail design changes are made without telling either the 
designer or the regulator because the changes are (wrongly) thought to be trivial. 
Changes to the building structure over the lifetime of the building may also reduce the 
efficacy the smoke management system, if these changes are not brought to the 
attention of the designer. 
• Poor construction/installation – Installation on site is often done by workers who do 
not know what the equipment is for, or why it is being fitted, and where the workers 
are under severe time pressure to finish the job. Some consequences have included: 
o a wheelbarrow and bricks left inside a smoke exhaust duct partially blocking it. 
o a fan installed backwards. 
o restraints intended to protect equipment during transit to the site not being 
removed before fitting. 
• Forgetfulness - A common example is the omission of smoke dampers in HVAC 
ducting, allowing siphoning of smoke when the HVAC is shut down. 
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• Simple incompetence - Although this is rare, examples have included: 
o designing ducts not strong enough to withstand the internal drop in pressure 
when fans are activated. 
o failure to design expansion joints into ducts held rigidly at the ends while 
immersed in the hot buoyant smoke layer. 
The examples given in the list above are real, however, they are not intended to be 
identifiable, for legal reasons. 
5.3 Commissioning 
A smoke management system should be commissioned after installation to ensure proper 
operation. As a minimum, ‘cold’ functional tests should be carried out of separate items 
of equipment, checking that the items match specification. The tests should confirm 
interconnections and controls between interacting components of the system.   
In some cases it may be desirable to test the performance of a system using buoyant 
smoke generated from a ‘real’ fire in situ, which is more commonly known as Hot Smoke 
Testing.  Possible reasons for carrying out a hot smoke test are: 
• where the design formulae cannot be applied with confidence. 
• where the approving authority demands a test. 
• to test the proper operation of the components of the complete system as installed. 
One of the two best known methods was developed by Atkinson and Marchant, which 
resulted in the publication of an Australian Standard [26]. This method uses alcohol fires 
directly beneath the final smoke reservoir, with pyrotechnic smoke generators being used 
to make the smoke visible. The second was developed by BRE, and has been used jointly 
by BRE and the IFSET [1]. This second method also uses alcohol fires, but uses cosmetic 
oil-mist generators to make the smoke visible.  The difference between the two methods 
is that the second has been used to test the “worst-case” condition of a spill plume 
scenario. Both methods require that the results of the test fire be extrapolated to the 
design fire size. Both methods have demonstrated that Hot Smoke Tests can be 
performed with no damage to the building being tested. 
Other methods for hot smoke testing include: 
• Use of propane burners to generate the hot gases and pyrotechnic smoke to visualise 
the plume (see Figure 6). 
• Ad-hoc burning of appropriate fuels (e.g. armchair, wood). 
• Use of space heaters to generate the hot gases and pyrotechnic smoke to visualise the 
plume. 
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Figure 6    A hot smoke test in a sports arena [27] 
 
A hot smoke test provides a means to assess the ‘real’ performance of a smoke 
management system.  It provides a means of ensuring that the design of a scheme has 
been properly implemented.  A hot smoke test can supplement any routine tests carried 
out in the building, especially if there is a complex logic system or complex geometry, 
and can provide an opportunity to observe the interactions between components that may 
normally have to be assessed in isolation.  The information obtained from a hot smoke 
test can include an assessment of the appropriateness of the core design with regards to 
air extraction and supply, the effectiveness of the basic implementation with regards to 
wind, local turbulence, bulk air movements, the formation of stagnant zones, smoke 
movement through voids or smoke getting into the wrong place, the essential and 
effective interactions between the various operating components, and the effect of the 
fine detail of the building design on the system, such as balconies and other structural 
features (many of which are seldom included in the simplified calculations).   
5.4 Approved products and services 
The efficacy of smoke management systems can be further enhanced by ensuring the use 
of products and related services which are fit for purpose and properly installed and 
maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions or a relevant standard. 
Third-party certification schemes (e.g. the LPCB certification mark, visit 
www.redbooklive.com) for fire protection products and related services are an effective 
means of providing the fullest possible assurances, offering a level of quality, reliability 
and safety that non-certificated  products may lack. 
5.5 A process validation methodology for the use of fire safety engineering 
As a way of addressing the concerns regarding the quality of smoke management systems 
which are being designed, specified and installed, it is important to be able to evaluate the 
design, the designer, the implementation of the design, and the long-term management, 
operation and maintenance of the safety systems, by means of well-accepted, practical 
and transparent criteria i.e. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). 
BRE has been commissioned by the Building Regulations Division of the Department for 
Communities and Local Government in the UK (DCLG) to carry out a three-year study 
on the development of KPIs to be used generally for buildings designed using fire safety 
engineering principles [28]. The overall aim of this project was to conduct an 
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investigation to determine the range, potential and ways forward in establishing 
acceptable and meaningful KPIs for fire safety engineering.   
Once the project was underway, the concept of KPIs was found to be misleading and was 
dropped in favour of the term “critical success factors” as part of a process validation 
scheme. 
This study examined the way fire engineered systems are designed, implemented on the 
construction site, commissioned, approved, maintained and managed, and has sought to 
identify ways by which the fire safety engineering might be evaluated (and, consequently, 
how the engineer might be evaluated).  A particularly important aspect of this study is an 
assessment of the ability of system designers and fire safety engineers to utilise available 
computational fire engineering tools for design and hazard assessment. 
This project was intended to be an investigation to determine the range, potential and 
ways forward in establishing acceptable and meaningful generic assessment criteria for 
fire safety engineering.  It has identified the users of such a scheme, in various capacities, 
but in particular those charged with the duty of approving design schemes. Issues that 
have been addressed include: 
• Fire safety engineering qualifications, scope and limitations. 
• Competent application of fire modelling tools in establishing design choice. 
• Design appropriateness, practicality, buildability, maintainability, reliability, 
testability. 
• Management implications. 
• Long term implications (reliability over the life of the building). 
The project has had two distinct components. The first represents a scoping study to 
explore the development of assessment criteria for the whole range of the fire engineered 
package from design through to installation. There is a need for more exploratory work 
for the broader package.  
The second component concerns the use of computer fire simulation within the overall 
design and hazard assessment process. The outline of a consensus already exists on the 
needs for criteria for this component, as a result of which computer modelling tools have 
already been identified as important for the assessment process and are being specifically 
addressed through a benchmarking process. 
5.5.1 Case study: A smoke management system in a shopping and leisure complex 
In order to evaluate the process validation scheme it was necessary to review/assess real 
buildings that have been designed using fire engineering principles. It is important to 
stress that the process validation scheme was being evaluated and not the actual 
buildings.  
As part of this study, a review and assessment was made of a 4-storey shopping and 
leisure complex consisting of covered malls and an 8-screen cinema.  The complex had 
approximately 90 shops distributed over three floors.  The top floor comprised of toilets, 
offices etc.  Original problems with the smoke management system as built resulted in 
legal action.  
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The key element in the fire engineered strategy was the use of a "zoned" smoke 
management system to protect the covered malls. This involved the operation of smoke 
exhaust ventilation and smoke curtains. The atrium space was divided into four zones 
which were defined by the structure of the building and smoke curtains which drop in the 
event of a fire. The smoke curtains are configured such that certain curtains do not drop 
(depending on the location of the fire) to combine two adjacent zones. This then provides 
two zones, such that the smoke is vented from the affected zone, and make-up air is 
provided from the unaffected zone.  Due to faults with the implementation of the original 
smoke control proposals, and subsequent legal action, this strategy is different to that 
originally proposed.   
The assessment/review highlighted the following issues: 
• The fire safety manager had a lack of understanding of the required cause and effect 
of the smoke curtain system in the enclosed space and the purpose of the smoke 
management system itself. This confusion occurred after the fire alarm system had 
been upgraded (less smoke curtains operated after this upgrade). The Fire Safety 
Manager assumed (incorrectly), that these changes were part of a new a fire strategy. 
• Poor communication had led to the fire safety manager to be unclear on the purpose 
of the smoke management system. The fire strategy document appears to have been 
ignored by the fire safety manager. 
• The smoke management system was tested every month. However, since there was 
some confusion on the correct cause and effect regarding the smoke curtains, it is 
unclear what these tests actually achieved. 
• Testing of the smoke management system was not entirely appropriate, as only one 
zone within the mall was regularly tested (only varying the storey of fire origin).  This 
was due to the presence of a manual call point in this zone making it more convenient 
to trigger the system. Triggering of the system in other zones involved the activation 
of a smoke detector at high level. Activation of the system from 3 of the 4 zones had 
not been carried out since commissioning some 13 years earlier. 
• A system test of the smoke management system was carried out by triggering the 
system on the second floor in the central mall (the zone that is routinely tested). 
Smoke curtains were observed to descend and the smoke extract and air inlet fans 
operated. The smoke curtains with the exhaust zone operated correctly, however the 
majority of curtains in the inlet zone did not operate.  It was observed that there were 
some large gaps between smoke curtains and some curtains descended to a different 
depth than others. Measurements of the air velocities from the fans on the roof 
demonstrated that the extract fan capacities were as per the fire strategy.  The inlet 
fans provided a volume flow rate which was approximately one third of the extract 
flow rate.  However, it appears that sufficient inlet air was obtained from other 
leakage paths. 
• As the majority of the smoke curtains in the 'inlet' zone did not operate in the first 
system test, there could have been significant implications on the efficacy of the 
smoke management system if a fire were to occur in this zone.  However, as it not 
clear whether these curtains should have operated, the fire safety manager invited 
BRE to carry out a further test in another ‘zone’ with all contractors responsible for 
the smoke management system being present. 
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• Prior to the second system test, a discussion took place with all contractors and 
personnel responsible for the smoke management system. The contractor responsible 
for the signalling of the smoke curtains was not aware of the required cause and effect 
for the building.  He was also not aware of the fire strategy report. 
• Late changes were made to the fire strategy prior to the opening of the building.  
These changes resulted in the non-operation of specific smoke curtains to combine 
adjacent zones.  The original contractor responsible for the signalling of the smoke 
curtains was not prepared to be responsible for those curtains which do not drop.  
Prior to the opening of the building, it was agreed that the contractor responsible for 
the fans and dampers would also take responsibility for the signalling of those 
specific smoke curtains.  Therefore, two different contractors were responsible for 
different parts of the same system.  These contractors had not been communicating 
with each other.  
• For the second system test, a smoke detector was activated within a zone which was 
an 'inlet' zone during on the first system test.  Some smoke curtains in this zone 
descended and the smoke extract/air supply fans operated.  Only half of the curtains 
in the 'extract' zone operated and none of the curtains in the 'inlet' zone operated.  The 
configuration of the curtains was such that the mall consisted of a single smoke 
control zone. 
At the time of the tests, serious problems with the smoke management system were 
highlighted.  However, as a result of the review, the relevant contractors are now 
communicating and the cause and effect requirements and purpose of the smoke control 
system are now clear. Problems with the signalling and operation of the smoke curtains 
have been resolved.   
5.5.2 General findings 
The general findings of the study have highlighted a number of issues which strongly 
suggest that the discipline of fire safety engineering has some way to go before we may 
have the same confidence in the fire safety systems in these sophisticated buildings as we 
do in traditionally designed buildings.  Problems were identified at all stages of the 
design, construction and operation of buildings that, in the event of a fire, could have life 
safety implications.   
The need for a process assessment scheme, that can provide a means of both design 
process validation and assist in the monitoring and management of fire safety over the 
lifetime of the building, has become very apparent. It has become evident that many fire 
safety managers, even in highly prestigious buildings, are newly qualified, poorly 
qualified or new to the particular building, do not understand the full extent of their 
responsibilities and have no robust and well-ordered documentation.  Some specific 
issues identified include: 
• The need for thorough and comprehensive documentation covering all aspects of the 
fire safety design, and not just the "engineered" parts. 
• The need for a well established and transparent audit trail for documentation. 
• The need for clear communications between the fire safety engineer and the fire 
safety manager on all aspects of the fire engineering, including the testing and 
maintenance implications. 
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• The need to clearly specify the management assumptions in the fire design. 
• The need for the manager to own and maintain comprehensive documentation 
covering all aspects of the fire safety design. 
• The need for continuity during management changes. 
• "Mix and match" buildings which involve a fire engineered part attached to a 
"traditionally" designed part and the need to ensure proper integration. 
• The complexity and interactions between the control systems in a large modern 
building. 
• The importance of properly arranged and documented commissioning tests. 
• The integration of fire safety with other safety issues. 
• The need for full and appropriate co-ordination and consultation with Building 
Control bodies and the fire service (and other safety enforcers). 
The proposed prototype assessment scheme offers a means to address these issues, 
although substantial development is still needed. The scheme is intended to increase the 
reliability of the fire safety system being effective in the event of a fire.  It therefore 
needs to apply over the entire working life-time of the building, and therefore addresses: 
design (including Fire Safety Engineering); construction, approvals and certification; 
commissioning and hand-over; day-to-day operation of the structure; training, inspection 
and maintenance; refurbishment, extensions or change of use; the structure when empty/ 
not in use and demolition. 
It is intended to be of value to the whole range of people involved in the life-cycle of the 
building. Many of the issues identified apply to all buildings, not just those using fire 
engineered principles. The scheme that has evolved is in essence a "check list".  The 
study to date has shown strong support from most of those consulted for the use of 
qualitative assessment criteria since quantitative criteria are not practicable.  It has also 
shown strong support for the adoption of “Binary” assessment criteria (Yes/No) where 
“No” may mean rejection of the entire design if the parameter involved is crucial to 
safety.  Given the variety of design, some factors may not be applicable to all 
circumstances. 
The proposed methodology provides a means of seeking to ensure that each and every 
key element within the design process has been considered (and shown in the 
documentation to have been considered) with the necessary level of detail. An example of 
part of the process validation methodology is given in the Appendix. A full version can 
be obtained from the lead author of this paper. BRE welcomes comments and feedback 
on the scheme, particularly where it has been tested on real projects. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a range of issues relating to smoke management in buildings with 
large enclosed spaces, including various smoke management methods, design fire 
scenarios and simple calculation methods, in addition to issues relating to the overall 
design process, reliability, commissioning and maintenance of such systems. Following a 
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review of actual installed systems and real examples of sources of failure, there are 
concerns over the efficacy of some smoke management systems, especially over the 
lifetime of a building. The importance of proper documentation, commissioning, 
maintenance and testing of these systems is crucial to ensure effective operation and 
performance. As a way of addressing these concerns, a process validation methodology is 
presented to evaluate the design, the designer, the implementation of the design, and the 
long-term management, operation and maintenance of such systems.   
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APPENDIX – AN EXAMPLE OF PART OF THE GENERIC PROCESS 
VALIDATION METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Approvers of Regulation  
1.1. Professional Credentials for key 
individuals 
 
1.1.1. Does the enforcer or AI, or the head of the 
enforcement team, have a FSE 
professional qualification appropriate to 
the design being checked? 
 
1.1.2. Is the regulatory check being done by 
someone at least as highly qualified as the 
designer in terms of professional 
qualifications?  
 
1.1.3. Where sufficient in-house expertise does 
not exist, has the enforcer or AI 
considered employing a suitably qualified 
“Third Party Checking Consultant”? 
 
1.1.4. Where design includes special features 
which require specialist knowledge, has 
consideration been given to employing 
suitable third-party specialists? 
 
1.1.5. Has it been ensured that the “Third Party 
Checking Consultant” is not paid directly 
by the Commercial side when working for 
an enforcer or AI?   
Note: Cost and charges may be passed on, but 
it must be crystal clear that the “Third Party 
Checking Consultant” is INDEPENDENT of 
commercial interests. 
1.2. Documentation  
1.2.1. Does the documentation include a 
detailed description of the fire safety 
design; with a full explanation of 
assumptions made, source documents for 
calculations, key values adopted for 
calculations, drawings showing 
appropriate details, etc.? (See above). 
Note that good drawings can save many words 
of text. Note also the importance of all such 
drawings being fully updated. Crucially, the 
drawings need to be “as installed” rather than 
“as intended”. 
1.2.2. Has the enforcer or AI provided written 
reasons for any amendments or limitations 
applied to the fire safety design? 
 
1.3. Checking procedures for 
Compliance 
 
1.3.1. Has adequate documentation been 
provided? 
 
1.3.2. Have the critical success factors listed 
above for the design been complied with? 
 
1.3.3. Can the enforcer or AI establish what is 
"plausible" in terms of “reasonable” 
criteria?  
 
1.3.4. Is the enforcer or AI able to use available 
"Best Practice" Guidance? 
 
1.3.5. Does the enforcer or AI require specialist 
FSE help?  
 
1.3.6. Does the enforcer or AI require specialist 
computer modelling help? 
 
1.3.6.1. Has the computer modelling been 
used sensibly? 
 
1.3.6.2. Are the computer models used 
"Bench Marked" models?   
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1.3.7. Have the relevant codes/ guidance been 
properly interpreted? 
 
1.3.7.1. Have the available "Best Practice" 
Guidance documents been used? 
Note that a “NO” answer does not necessarily 
invalidate the design, especially where good 
alternatives have been adopted. This will be 
particularly the case for innovative designs. 
1.3.8. Does the design satisfy the requirements?  
Is this clear? 
 
1.3.8.1. Have the source guidance 
documents been "pick and mixed"?  
Has this been done properly? 
 
1.3.9. Have the continuing enforcement issues 
relating to the life of the building been 
considered? 
 
1.3.10. Is appropriate in-situ commissioning 
proposed? 
If not, should it be demanded? 
1.3.11. Where a disagreement exists as to the 
compliance of a design, has the primary 
checker (either the senior qualified in-
house team member, or the third-party 
consultant), tried to resolve the differences 
by direct discussion with the designers, 
before other enforcement routes are 
taken?  
Note: This ensures that the checker’s 
arguments are themselves checked by the 
original designer. 
1.3.12. Where disagreement continues, has the 
possibility of arbitration by a specialist 
expert been considered? 
 
1.3.13. Is the approval subject to proof of 
operation by in-situ commissioning and/or 
acceptance tests? 
 
1.3.14. Is there provision for continuing 
enforcement to ensure that there are no 
significant departures from the fire safety 
strategy and its implementation? 
We need to be realistic regarding what can be 
expected from Building Control bodies or fire 
officers, and the resources they have available 
to employ third party checkers.  However, we 
need to identify the expectations put upon them 
by the fire safety engineers.  There appear to be 
differences in approach between London and 
the rest of England and Wales.  The importance 
of commissioning tests is mentioned above. 
1.3.15. Is there a robust maintenance etc 
regime proposed? 
 
1.3.16. Are adequate back-up systems 
provided? 
 
 
 
 
  
2. Fire Safety Management  
2.1. Professional Credentials for key 
individuals 
 
2.1.1. Has the Fire Safety Manager (who may be 
a team leader in a large building) evidence 
of appropriate training in fire safety? 
 
2.1.2. Is the fire safety manager a member of an 
appropriate learned institute with an 
interest in fire safety? 
Preferable but not always essential. 
2.1.3. Is the fire safety manager encouraged to 
take part in CPD courses recognised by 
appropriate learned institutes? 
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2.1.4. Is the fire safety manager sufficiently 
senior in the managing organisation to 
have the authority and resources 
necessary for him/her to fulfil their duties 
and responsibilities? (Note: In particular, it 
should not be possible for them to be 
over-ruled by commercial considerations 
on fundamental safety issues.) 
 
2.2. Documentation  
2.2.1. Is there a “Building Log Book” available to 
the fire safety manager?  (See above). 
 
2.2.2. Does this documentation include a copy of 
the final fire safety strategy report 
prepared by the FSE designers, as well as 
details of the installed fire safety systems 
provided by the suppliers and installers of 
those systems? 
 
2.2.3. Does the Log Book include details of 
changes which may affect the fire safety 
systems in the building?  
 
2.2.4. Has adequate documentation been 
provided regarding the managers duties 
and responsibilities? Does the 
documentation provided by the designer 
provide adequate information on the 
manager's duties? 
 
2.2.5. Is the documentation kept in a safe but 
identified location? 
 
2.2.6. Does the documentation enable the fire 
safety manager to understand how design 
helps the building management? 
Have provisions been made by the building 
owners or management to enable the fire safety 
manager to understand how design helps the 
building management? 
2.2.7. Does the documentation enable the 
manager to understand what needs to be 
provided in the fire safety system for 
reliability, availability, resilience, 
inspectability, maintainability, repairability, 
testability? 
Have provisions been made to enable the 
manager to understand what has been provided 
in the fire safety system for reliability, 
availability, resilience, inspectability, 
maintainability, repairability, testability? 
2.2.8. Does the documentation enable the 
manager to ensure that the safety systems 
are correctly installed? 
 
2.2.9. Are adequate "back-up" systems 
provided? 
 
 
2.2.10. Have provisions been made to enable 
the manager to recognise and allow for 
changes in building use? 
Change of use can imply significant implications 
for the Fire Safety provisions even where there 
is no “change of use” in purely regulatory terms. 
E.g. changes of geometry within a single 
category such as retail can imply a redesign of 
active and passive fire protection designs. 
2.2.11. Have provisions been made to enable 
the manager to recognise and allow for 
changes in occupancy levels? 
For example, this can have major implications 
for Means of Escape, which can lead to 
redesign of stairwells and other features. 
2.2.12. Is there continuity during management 
changes? 
 
2.2.13. Are there un-diffused responsibilities, 
with clear and comprehensive lines of 
responsibility? 
In many complex buildings, different engineers 
have responsibility for different parts of the fire 
safety system, with little co-ordination. 
2.2.14. Do the manager's duties include regular 
inspection and testing of the fire safety 
Strengthen?  On-going maintenance, testing; 
adequate maintenance, checks, repair? 
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equipment to ensure proper function as 
described in the fire safety strategy, 
according to a schedule set down in the 
Building Documentation/Log Book? 
2.2.15. Do the manager's duties include 
frequent inspection of Means of Escape 
and Means of Fire Service Access to 
ensure compliance with the fire safety 
strategy? 
 
2.2.16. Do the manager's duties include 
ensuring rapid repair and restitution of any 
fire safety equipment found to be faulty, 
and that temporary additional safety 
precautions are put into place pending 
successful completion of that action? 
 
2.2.17. Do the manager's duties include 
ensuring regular maintenance schedules 
of fire safety equipment as recommended 
by the suppliers/installers of that 
equipment? 
 
2.2.18. Do the manager's duties include 
ensuring that the documentation is kept 
up-to-date by including a full maintenance 
record, details of any tests, descriptions 
(with drawings where needed for clarity) of 
any alterations to the building, etc? 
 
2.2.19. Do the manager's duties include 
ensuring that any authority with continuing 
enforcement responsibilities, and the fire 
service in any case, receives updated 
copies of the “Building Log Book” when 
any alterations or amendments are 
included therein? 
 
2.2.20. Do the manager's duties include 
ensuring that the full documentation is 
made available to any successor, 
including when the building changes 
ownership or management regime?  
(Note; the Fire Safety Manager's overall 
duties should be as defined elsewhere 
(notable BS 9999 (draft) or BS 5588 Part 
12 (in due course)) but the duties specified 
above are those that are specific to a fire 
engineered building). 
It is evident that the proper communications 
between the fire safety engineer and the "fire 
safety" manager is a critical, if not the critical, 
component in the fire safety engineering 
process.  Similarly, the manager must have 
available all other documentation relating to the 
safety systems, such as instruction books and 
results of commissioning tests.  There is also a 
significant issue regarding the relationship of the 
fire safety manager and the other people in the 
building with parallel duties, e.g. for 
maintenance or other safety issues.  Co-
ordination of these responsibilities is essential if 
key elements of the safety system do not "fall 
through the cracks".  Similarly there is a need 
for good co-ordination between managers of 
different parts of the building, for example 
between owner managers and tenants. 
 
